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Along with the classical problem of managing multiple identities, actions, devices,
APIs etc. in different businesses, there has been an escalating need for having
the capability of flexible attribute based access control (ABAC) mechanisms. In
order to fill this gap, several variations of ABAC model have been proposed such as
Amazon’s AWS IAM, which uses JSON as their underlying storage data structure
and adds policies/constraints as fields over the regular ABAC. However, these
systems still do not provide the capability to have customized permissions and to
perform various operations (such as comparison/aggregation) on them. In this
paper, we introduce a string based resource naming strategy that supports the
customized and conditional permissions for resource access. Further, we propose
the basic architecture of our system which, along with our naming scheme, makes
the system scalable, secure, efficient, flexible and customizable. Finally, we present
the proof of concept for our algorithm as well as the experimental set up and the
future trajectory for this work.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing need for managing identities,
actions, devices, and third-party APIs in the new era
of Internet. Based on the concept of role based access
control system [1], researchers proposed an attribute
based access control (ABAC) model [2][3] to provide
increased flexibility, which has been widely used by
the industry. IBM Permission Control System [4] and
Amazon’s AWS IAM [5] are famous derivatives of the
ABAC model. There are also third-party access control
management system that implements ABAC model,
such as
Unlike traditional access control systems, with the
support of the Internet of Things, conditional and
customized permissions toward specific resources play
an important role in modern resource management
systems. To support this, Amazon introduced identity
based policies and resource based policies [6], where
all the conditional policies are managed in the type of
JSON document with an optional field ”Conditions”.
Inspired by this representation, we introduce a string
based resource naming strategy that support resource,
permission, as well as customized attributes introduced
by permission administrators.
Scalability is another challenge for designing a
permission management system. Most of the current
solutions rely on in memory attribute relationships
for low latency permission validation. However, data
replication and persistence highly affect the stability
of the overall system and then create failure to all the
calling services. In this paper, we use a distributed in-
memory graph data model as the permission data store
which provide fail-safe multi-region data existence to
keep the scalability and stability.
As an access control system, security should also be
maintained using certain mechanisms. Goyal et, al. [7]
proposed a method that can perform attribute-based
encryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted
data. In our design, we combine the attribute-based
encryption mechanism with the benefit of using this
system in a private cloud, all permission validation
is categorized into two access layers to ensure both
security and usability.
In the practice of engineering use, access logs with
multi-region is also a key factor of the system design.
To maintain the same accessibility as the access control
data, we choose to use the same data store design for the
two types of data. Weil et, al. [8] introduced a method
by applying role based auditing system to ABAC
systems. Inspired by this, we add group based logging
indexed by permission consumer, which simplifies the
audit of logging based on attributes without losing the
benefit from ABAC designs.
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FIGURE 1. Binary Data Permission Flow
2. ARCHITECTURE
In our paper, we use an in memory graph data structure
as the storage of all permission data, and a BigTable [9]
like NoSQL database for persistent permission records.
Based on the usage cases, the system has two trusted
levels - permission for binary data and permission
for encrypted data. Refer to Figure 1.1, Permission
Enforcement Point is a service that takes in ingress
requests and is the caller of the permission management
system (PMS). Action point is hidden from the public,
protected by the infrastructure firewalls and network
settings, handles the actual requests and has the
ability to access the database. Usually the permission
management system can only be called within the
private network (see section 2.1). However for IoT
devices and public services outside of the private
network, we’ll use an encrypted protocol to pass over
the action results (see section 2.2).
2.1. Binary Data Permission Flow
Binary data permission flow is a widely used
architecture for most of permission management
systems. As the action point is protected by the
infrastructure of private network, data transmitted
between enforcement point and the action point is
considered as secure so there is no encryption needed.
As shown in FIGURE 1. Binary data is not encrypted
and should only be transmitted within a secured private
cloud environment. When doing internal permission
grant, the Permission Enforcement Point (PEP) first
receives a request to take some actions on other services.
Then it checks with the PMS and get back a result
of either GRANTED or UNAUTHORIZED. If the
result is GRANTED, the PEP performs a call to the
action service to continue processing, otherwise the
PEP returns UNAUTHORIZED to the caller and stops
processing.
This procedure helps prevent the data from being
leaked from the action service without a proper
permission being granted by the PMS. On the other
hand, this simplifies the architecture that has to be
implemented before using the PMS.
FIGURE 2. Encrypted Data Permission Flow
2.2. Encrypted Data Permission Flow
When an IoT device or any other public service is the
action service, data transferred back to the caller has
to be encrypted after the action is taken. Goyal et,
al. [7] gives a way to do permission checks on data
exchange with an nonparallel encryption strategy with
private key saved at the permission consumer’s side.
This method solves the case that all the services are
exposed to the public network, where the data flow is
not protected by the features of a private network.
As shown in FIGURE 2. The permission system
issues a short time public key to the action point
to encrypt the data. Then the consumer gets the
encrypted data from the action point and uses the
private key stored to decrypt the data. For this case,
there are no enforcement points needed. Action point
can directly talk to the permission system to check for
permissions.
3. PERMISSION GRAPH MODEL
We use a directed graph structure to implement our
algorithm. As shown in FIGURE 3, we define the
permission graph G to be
G = {(C, N,E(n1, n2)) | n1, n2 ∈ N,n2 6∈ C,
cycle(N,E) is false}
and cycle(N,E) is true if∃m ∈ N s.t.
E(n1, n2), E(n2, n3), ..., E(nm, n1) are in G
where N is a collection of graph node n represented
by a resource name R where a set of permissions
P is associated, E(n1, n2) is a set of directed edges
representing connections between two nodes n1 and n2,
and C is a collection of consumers where no direct
edges point to. Then we can easily get C ⊂ N from
the definition. In this graph, we call n2 the parent of
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FIGURE 3. Permission Graph Model
n1 if E(n1, n2) is in G. And intuitively, we call n1
the child of n2 under the same condition. To better
describe and model the permission structure, inspired
by Amazon [10], we use a resource name to represent an
item, a permission, or a conditional permission within
the system. Accordingly, there are a total of three types
of resource names: item, permission and conditional
permission. We give the definition of a resource name
R as a 3, 4 or 5-tuple according to the type of resource
name:
Ritem = (b, i, s)
Rperm = (b, i, s, l)
Rcond = (b, i, s, l, v)
where b is base string, i is identifier, s is attribute or
scope, l is permission level and v is permission condition
value. To simplify the levels for a given permission,
we require l ∈ {admin, edit, view} where the system
user can give definition and privilege regarding the three
levels. Value v, in this definition, has to be comparable
for a given attribute or scope s to suffice the calculation
requirements. We now define the notion of a conflict
between two feature resource names and then present
the two core operations (unite, unionsq and overwrite, u)
required to aggregate the feature list for an entity.
Conflict function C on two ARN vectors α =
(bα, iα, sα, lα, vα) and β = (bβ , iβ , sβ , lβ , vβ) is defined
as
C(α, β) : (bα = bβ , iα = iβ , sα = sβ , lα 6= lβ , vα 6= vβ)
We can further classify C as Cl(α, β), conflict due
to different level and Cv(α, β), conflict due to different
range value with lα = lβ . Similarly, non-conflict
function C˜ is described-
C˜(α, β) : (bα = bβ , iα = iβ , sα = sβ , lα = lβ , vα = vβ)
Since each node is modeled as an entity having a list
of resource name. Let A and B denote two peer nodes
such that A = {α1, α2, ...} and B = {β1, β2, ...}, for Cl,
we define-
A unionsqB = (A ∪B) |C˜(α,β) ∪(Max.(l){A,B}) |Cl(α,β)
Or in case of Cv, we can write-
(A ∪B) |C˜(α,β) {Max.(v)(A,B)} |Cv(α,β)
Since we keep the maximum of the level (Cl) or
the maximum range value (Cv) while performing unite
operation, for the sake of convinience, we can write a
generalized form of the above equation which we will be
using for further proofs-
A unionsqB = (A ∪B) |C˜(α,β) ∪{Max.(A,B)} |C(α,β) (1)
Next, we define the overwrite operation for two nodes
A and B such that node B is the child of node A-
A uB = (A ∪B) |C˜ ∪(A) |C (2)
Using the above definitions, we can show that unite
operation follows the associative law.
Lemma 1: P unionsq (Q unionsq R) = (P unionsq Q) unionsq R However,
for overwrite operation, the order of operation matters
and therefore, it does not follow the associative law.
Also, these operations follow usual distributive laws
with regular set operations.
Lemma 2: P unionsq (Q ∪R) = (P unionsqQ) ∪ (P unionsqR)
Lemma 3: P u (Q ∪R) = (P uQ) ∪ (P uR)
We prove these lemmas in appendix A.
For the simplest graph with source node P having
children Q and R (Q and R being peers), the output
set of aggregate algorithm on node P denoted by Pˆ is
defined as-
Pˆ = P u (Q unionsqR) (3)
We can now prove the validity of the distributive law
over these operations.
Lemma 4: P u (Q unionsqR) = (P uQ) unionsq (P uR)
Proof : The equation on the right can be expanded as-
P u ((Q ∪R) |C˜ ∪{Max.(Q,R)} |C)
From Lemma 3 we can write-
(P u (Q ∪R) |C˜(q,r)) ∪ (P u {Max.(Q,R)} |C(q,r))
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Expanding the above equation-
[(P ∪Q ∪R) |C˜(p,q,r) ∪(P ) |C(p,q,r)] ∪ [{(P ∪Q) |C˜(p,q),q>r
∪ (P ) |C(p,q)} ∪ {(P ∪R) |C˜(p,r),q<r ∪(P ) |C(p,r)}]
[(P ∪Q) |C˜(p,q) ∪(P ) |C(p,q))] ∪ [(P ∪R) |C˜(p,r) ∪(P ) |C(p,r))]
∪ [Max.(P ∪Q) |C(p,q), (P ∪R) |C(p,r)]
which, by definition is-
(P uQ) unionsq (P uR)
And by induction, it is easy to prove for n child nodes.
Therefore,
P u(Q1unionsqQ2unionsq ...Qn) = (P uQ1)unionsq(P uQ2)unionsq ...(P uQn)
(4)
This aggregate function is applied on each node in
the graph connected to the root in order to get its
feature list. We suggest a bottom up approach which
involves doing a depth-first search on the nodes and
then aggregating features for each node in a breadth
first manner.
Using the above implementation strategy, the
complexity of the aggregate algorithm can be calculated
by defining n(C) as the number of conflicts in a graph
having a total of N nodes. If each node on an average
has m features, intuitively, the worst case occurs when
n(C) = N.m, and therefore the average complexity can
be written as Θ(N.m).
4. FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented our strategy to have a
customizable ABAC system which uses our aggregate
algorithm over the graph derived from the underlying
database. As our future trajectory, we propose to use
an in memory graph database to store each item or
frequently used items. This will reduce the overhead
of constructing a graph every time a request is made
to access it. Further, in the graph database, it will be
easier to to propagate the changes to all the connected
nodes.
In order to increase the robustness, we propose to
have a master - slave model where both the master
as well as the slaves are identical having a data
layer (graph database) and a compute layer (aggregate
algorithm). However, only the master stays inside the
memory and is updated frequently whereas the slave
nodes are redundant nodes which will be updated after
regular intervals and will replace the master in case of
a failure. This architecture can be further extended by
having multiple replicas. The number of layers can be
decided based on the criticality of the business.
For bigger organizations with a global outreach, we
propose to have a multi-regional support on distributed
databases, where data sharing among these data centers
can be done using global messaging queues. It would
also require the master to perform additional operations
including routing of data based on the markers and the
location.
5. CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX A.
Lemma 1: P unionsq (Q unionsqR) = (P unionsqQ) unionsqR
Proof: (P ∪ [(Q ∪R)] |C˜) ∪ (Max.{P, (Max.{Q,R}}) |C)
([P ∪Q] ∪R |C˜) ∪ (Max.{Max.{P,Q}, R} |C)
which is (P unionsqQ) unionsqR
Lemma 2: P unionsq (Q ∪R) = (P unionsqQ) ∪ (P unionsqR)
Proof: ([P ∪ (Q ∪R)] |C˜) ∪ (Max.{P, (Q ∪R)} |C)
([P ∪Q] ∪ [P ∪R]) |C˜ ∪(Max.{Max.{P,Q},Max.{P,R} |C)
which is equal to (P unionsq Q) ∪ (P unionsq R), since it doesn’t
matter how we calculate the maximum of all the sets.
Lemma 3: P u (Q ∪R) = (P uQ) ∪ (P uR)
Proof: ([P ∪ (Q ∪R)] |C˜) ∪ (Max.{P, (Q ∪R)} |C)
([P ∪Q] ∪ [P ∪R]) |C˜ ∪(P ) |C
which can be combined to form (P uQ) ∪ (P uR)
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